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EFFECTS OF THIRD PERSON PERCEPTION AND 
INFORMATION SYSTEM ON STOCK MARKET CRASH 
Myunsoo, Kim, College of Business, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 
Seoul, Korea, jamaica@business.kaist.ac.kr 
Abstract 
Switching stock market trading strategies between price trading and trend following can be heavily 
affected by how one trader anticipates other traders’ behavior. This paper suggests an agent based 
model which allows agents to be under effect of third-person perception and to use external 
information system such as search engines and social network services which provide information on 
other traders’ tendencies. The analysis shows heavy third person perception can trigger positive 
feedback to market crash, while light or no third person perception may trigger positive feedback to 
market stabilization. External information system may interact with third person perception and 
hasten or delay triggering positive feedback, according to the quality of the system. This paper adds 
two different yet closely related considerations to current understandings on how price traders and 
trend followers interacts each other: third person perception and information systems quality. The 
managers should be aware of that information on third person from new information technology such 
as Facebook may either improve or harm the stability of a collective behavior. 
Keywords: third person perception, stock market crash, information systems 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Two different regimes of traders are known to exist in a stock market, price traders and herd traders 
(Boswijk, Hommes and Manzan, 2007). Price traders or fundamentalists believe in the mean-
reversion of stock prices towards a true value. They believe that the market is efficient enough to 
quickly correct any deviation from the true value, therefore their strategies are based on analyzing 
fundamentals. On the other hand, trend followers or chartists believe that a direction of price 
movement would continue (DeBondt, 1993). Their belief is often explained with psychological bias of 
representativeness, rather than a logical decision because if one considers the stock market shows 
random movement, thus is efficient and past movement should nothing to do with future expectations 
(Shiller and Pierre, 1985).  
The trend followers are thought to be the source of a market crash by some scientists and practitioners 
alike (Renshaw, 1984; White, 1990), because of the possibility of initiating positive feedback of panic 
selling (Walter and Weber,2006; Mosebach and Najand, 1999). As a small number of traders follow 
the trend, the momentum increases and the more traders would follow the trend, which would increase 
the momentum. On the other hand, as efficient market theory suggests, fundamentalists may prevent 
buildup of the momentum, because any deviations from true value will be promptly corrected by 
rational arbitrage seekers (Malkiel, 2003;Shleifer, 2000). For example, as soon as price dropped 
below the fundamentals, all of the fundamentalists would buy the stock, moving the price back at its 
rightful place (Renshaw, 1984). 
The coexistence of heterogeneous trader regimes is suggested by many studies (Brock and 
Hommes ,1997, 1998; Shiller (2000), Fisher and Statman (2002) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) , 
however, very few studies investigated interactions between different regimes and strategic regime 
switching. A trader can change their strategy from assessing fundamentals to follow trends, if they 
think trend followers are dominant in the market. They may still believe the price will return to its 
fundamental value eventually, however, at least for a short term, the market may be dominated by 
trend followers, and it would be unprofitable if not following them. Boswijk, Hommes and Manzan 
(2007), henceforth BHM, explained changing strategy according to the past performance can produce 
at least short-run correction inefficiency.  
Therefore an important question arises: how a trader anticipates other traders’ behaviors?  If the 
fundamentalist think that there are too many trend followers in the market, the fundamentalist may 
join the trend following even if she still believes in the fundamentals (Sornette, 2003). However, how 
an individual trader, who is under threat of the domination of the other regime, anticipates other 
traders’ behaviors is not yet thoroughly considered in the related field and that is where I aim to 
contribute. This paper suggests two additional considerations to current understandings about the 
interactions between fundamentalists and trend followers.  
First, third-person perception may increase the market instability by triggering cascade of trend 
following. Third-person perception is a psychological concept originally introduced by media 
scientists (Paul, Salwen, & Dupagne, 2000; Perloff, 1993; 1999, Sun, Pan, & Shen, 2008).  Davison 
(1983) particularly introduces an example about the third-person effect on stock market trading: 
“Fluctuations in the stock market are not infrequently accounted for by reference to rumors or news 
reports.  The reasoning seems to be that these reports will cause others to sell (or buy) certain 
categories of shares; therefore, I will sell (or buy) in order to anticipate their action.” (p. 13) Jung 
(2012) empirically showed that third-person perception exists in the minds of average and expert 
traders alike, and suggested the possibility of triggering positive feedback to market crash.  
Second additional consideration is that the widespread use and improvement of general information 
systems such as search engines, SNS and online communities, may affect quality of predicting other 
traders’ behavior. Numerous academic studies and business entities suggest that the information about 
users of those services can be extracted and even practically useful (Preis, Reith and Stanley 2010; 
Mangold and Faulds 2009). Therefore, it is at least more feasible than before to assess other people’s’ 
tendency or strategies. If the other traders’ behaviors can be predicted with better precision, the trader 
may not have to “guess” anymore and can switch the strategy according to the information. These two 
different yet closely related considerations are parameterized in my model and showed they can 
dramatically change collective market behavior such as triggering, blocking, hastening and delaying 
market crash.  
The following section addresses related literatures and research questions. Section 3 introduces 
computational model. Analysis results are presented at section 4, and the last section discusses 
implications and future research. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Rise of Trend Following Regime  
As Malkiel (2003) described, since introduction of efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970), more 
than a generation a stock market is considered to show random walk and thus efficient. If a trader 
believes that the market is efficient, there is no reason to consider past history, or momentum. 
However, behavioral scientists suggested that some traders believe that the stock price changes will 
continue in the direction recently observed. Anderson et al. (2000) argued that trend following is one 
of the major strategy used by technical analysis. These extrapolative expectations, or trend following, 
attracted many researchers and numerous explanations are suggested, such as representativeness 
(Pepper and Oliver, 2006), emotions (Nofsinger 2005; Prechter 1999, 2001), social mood 
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor 2002), 
overconfidence (Barber and Odean 1999; Presson and Benassi 1996). Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) suggested difference in interpretation of private information can result 
heterogeneity of trend following tendency. Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Bamber, Barron, and 
Stober (1999) found empirical evidences that there exist traders with heterogeneous expectations. The 
coexistence of heterogeneous regimes means that a trader may switch between regimes if she thinks 
one regime may outperform the other. Researchers interested in extreme stock market behavior such 
as bubbles and crashes suggested that trend following may create positive a feedback loop, inducing 
extreme collective behaviors like bubble or crash of market (Sornette 2003). 
2.2 Third Person Perception  
Scientists in mass communication field suggested various subjects of third-person perception. About 
watching violent TV programs (Rojas, Shah, & Faber, 1996; Salwen & Dupagne, 1999), sexual media 
contents (Chia, Lu, & McLeod, 2004; Gunther, 1995; Lee & Tomborini, 2005; Lo & Wei, 2002; 
2005; Lo, Wei, & Wu, 2010; Wu & Koo, 2001) and harmful advertisements (Gunther et al., 2006; 
Henriksen & Flora, 1999), people are likely to overestimate the effect of mass media on others. 
Psychologists suggested that attribution theory including fundamental attribution error and egotistical 
differential attributions are behind the third person perception (Gunther, 1991; Ruciniski & Salmon, 
1990). Although it is suggested that third person perception can exist and affect stock market traders 
(Davison, 1983), only by Jung (2012) it is empirically tested that stock market traders, whether they 
are seasoned professionals or amateur college students, show that they are under effect of third person 
perception: both professionals and amateurs think that traders in general should be warned about 
anonymous stock recommendations can be just a rumour. He also showed that experienced 
professionals have greater third person perception than amateurs. De Bondt (1993) found uninformed 
investors extrapolate trends. These previous studies suggest that traders who are under third person 
perception may overestimate the number of trend followers in the market, because they think that 
other traders in general are more likely to be affected by trends or charts rather than fundamentals.  
2.3 Information Systems  
Search engines like Google, can provide information about what general search users are interested in. 
Simply putting keywords in Google trend analysis shows a good amount of information about the 
keyword’s popularity. Preis, Reith and Stanley (2010) took one step further and showed that search 
engine query data and stock market trading volume are strongly correlated. Mangold and Faulds 
(2009) pointed out that SNS are used for both promotion and market research. Already various firms 
are selling market research information, processed from SNS data. Services like Tweetfeel provides 
keyword based sentiment analysis, allowing a firm to monitor what kinds of impressions its products 
giving out to its customers. In addition to number of online communities dedicated to stock market 
trading, these search engines and SNS sentiment analysis may provide information about what other 
traders are thinking about. If third person effect is from lack of information about other traders, these 
new information systems can offset the third person perception, because they may provide more direct 
approach to anticipate other traders’ strategies.  
The research question is: how third person perception and information systems can affect stock 
market traders’ strategies and therefore can change the market behavior. 
3 THE MODEL 
3.1 Experiments Settings 
Suppose a group of traders total number of N who are interested in buying and selling a specific asset. 
Trader i’s tendency to trend following, vi, is uniformly distributed over [0,1]. At each period a trader 
is given a chance to buy or sell only one unit amount of securitized asset, in a randomized order. Each 
“purchase call” increases the price of the asset by one point, and “sell call” decreases the price of the 
asset by one point. To simplify decision analysis, let the trader i’s valuation of the fundamental or 
willpower to resist accepting a representative pattern or a trend, wi, as a reversed value of tendency to 
trend following, wi = 1-vi. The smaller the value of wi, the more the trader is likely to follow the trend.  
The momentum of the asset price at period j is calculated as average price change for last given 
number of periods, normalized and equally weighted, expressed as 
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where T is the number of last periods considered in the moementum, Rj is the asset’s price at the 
period j. At a given level of momentum, the traders who has less wi than the momentum becomes a 
trend follower, otherwise, she remains at fundamentalists regime. 
 
Condition Strategy 
wi > fj  Follow fundamental 
wi <= fj Follow trend 
Table 1. Agent’s decision without anticipation of other traders’ behavior 
The initial price of the asset is set to zero. Although in the real world the price of an asset is 
determined by negotiation between buyers and sellers, to focus on the collective dynamic behavior of 
price movements, the pricing mechanism in this model is simplified to that of a voting system. As 
Montier (2002) suggested a beauty contest incorporating a voting system can be an explanation of a 
stock market bubbles, a simple voting mechanism can show the effects of traders’ collective strategies 
without additional complexities. At the start of the simulation, news which redefines the economic 
fundamental of the asset is published. Each trader can anticipate other traders’ behavior under effect 
of third person perception. Third person perception is modelled as how a trader overestimates other 
traders’ tendency to trend following relative to its own, given that the trader does not have any 
information about other traders’ valuations. For example, a trader who has willpower of wi under 
effect of third person perception strength of pi, estimates average willpower of the traders as wi-pi. 
 
Condition Strategy 
wi -pi> fj  Follow fundamental 
wi -pi<= fj Follow trend 
Table 2. Agent’s decision under third person perception 
Each trader can have different trust level of the external information system. External information 
system suggests the other traders’ average willpower (ve). However, only If the technological quality 
of the information system(q) exceeds one’s skepticism on the information system (si), the trader give 
up guessing the other traders’ behavior by oneself and accepts the traders’ average willpower 
suggested by the information system. 
 
External IS Accepted average willpower Condition Strategy 
q > si ve  ve > fj Follow fundamental 
ve <= fj Follow trend 
q <= si wi-pi  wi-pi > fj Follow fundamental 
wi-pi <= fj Follow trend 
Table 3. Agent’s decision under third person perception with external IS 
The basic parameters used in the analysis are set to: 
 
Parameter Value 
Number of agents (N) 100 
Total number of periods played 1000 
Number of last periods 
considered in momentum (T) 
20 
Initial price of the asset 0 
Table 4. Basic parameters used in the experiments 
Number of agents and total periods played are chosen to balance simulation load and fidelity, and the 
number of last periods considered in momentum is chosen to maximize the scale of system dynamics 
to easier observation and comparison, within the limit of other parameter values. 
3.2 Analysis 
The simulation is conducted from the simplest settings to increasingly more complex settings. In the 
first experiment, all the agents are extreme fundamentalists (for all i, wi = 0), have no third person 
perception (for all i, pi=0) and IS quality is zero (q=0). 
3.2.1 Case 0: No trend followers, no third person perception, no IS available  
The new fundamental value of the asset is set to -1000, at the beginning of the experiment. Each agent 
can only call buy or sell one unit of the asset and the total number of agents is 100, it takes about 10 
periods to price drop to -1000 from 0. Since all the agents are extreme fundamentalists, they call “sell 
the asset” until the price match with the new fundamental. The momentum builds up as the price 
declines, however since no agents care about the momentum,, the price of the asset immediately 
stabilizes once the price met with the new fundamental value. Figure 1 shows an example of the 
market behavior of this case. With case 0, the baseline behavior is set and following cases show 
changes in market behavior under more complex settings. 
 
Figure 1. Example of price dynamics under case 0 
3.2.2 Case 1: Heterogenous trader regimes, no third person perception, no IS available  
Now each agent has different willpower to resist trend following. The willpower wi is uniformly 
distributed over [0,1]. As some traders will follow the trend even after the price met with the new 
fundamentals, the price no longer stabilizes immediately. 
In the example of Figure 2, it is shown that even after the price reaches its new fundamental value, 
trend followers continue to follow the trend thus call “sell”, while remaining fundamentalists call 
“buy” since they believe mispricing by trend followers will be corrected immediately. 
 
Figure 2. Example of price dynamics under case 1 
The struggle between two regimes continues, and early in the specific example it even shows a sign of 
the positive feedback to market crash with increasing magnitude of declining slope of price, around 
period 19 to 23. However, once the positive feedback to stabilization kicks in around period 25, the 
momentum reduces dramatically and the market stabilizes. At this point it is need to determine crash 
and stabilization of the market. The following criterions are used to tell the differences: 
 
State Criteria 
Crash (Unstable) After 1000 periods, the price is with in 10% of the minimum possible price, 
which is realized when all the agents call “sell” for all 100 periods. 
In-between (Unstable) After 1000 periods, the price is not in crash nor in stable 
Stable After 1000 periods, the price is within 10% of new fundamental value 
Table 5. Criterions for market stability 
One can expect the initial build-up of the momentum by the scale of shock from the news may decide 
the fate of the market. Thus, stability of the market along with the magnitude of initial shock is shown 
below: 
New fundamental Initial Momentum Instability ratio Avg(MAX_mom) Avg(STD) 
-2000 1 1.0 1.000 4100 
-1800 0.9 0.95 0.993 2691.725 
-1600 0.8 0.65 0.938 1388.291 
-1400 0.7 0.30 0.842 519.8671 
-1200 0.6 0 0.721 103.7293 
-1000 0.5 0 0.538 14.4309 
Table 6. Instability under different initial shock  
The first column of the above table shows how shocking the news is. The second column converted 
the shock from the news into initial buildup of the momentum. At each news value, the simulation ran 
100 times. Instability ratio is the portion of unstable results, which includes crash and in-between state, 
out of total of 100 simulations. The third column shows average of the maximum momentum reached 
during each simulation. The final column shows averaged deviation from the new fundamental during 
each simulation. Since the model assumes finite uniform distribution of willpower, initial momentum 
magnitude of 1 results deterministic crash. However, only with a small number of the survival 
fundamentalists can put the price back on the fundamental. For example, at initial momentum 0.6 and 
the momentum increased to as high as 0.72 during the simulation, zero unstable market state finally 
reported. Also, the deviation from the new fundamental value exponentially drops as magnitude of the 
shock decreases. 
The following figure shows how instability and deviation changes with increase of shock scale. 
 
Figure 3. Instability and deviation according to initial shock under case 1 
The results suggest that the positive feedback to stability is clearly overpowered in this case because 
the assumptions used in this case strongly favor fundamentalists. While becoming trend followers are 
determined by the magnitude of current momentum, once a trader becomes a fundamentalists the 
trader blindly call “buy” believing that the mispricing will be corrected immediately. The sampled 
price dynamics from each big news (-1600) and small news (-1200) is drawn in Figure 4. 
The bigger the initial momentum is, the bigger the positive feedback to stability and ironically this 
“back to the fundamental value movement” creates momentum to the other direction and it may leads 
to slight overpricing. Thus struggle between the two regimes continues a little longer while these 
fluctuations scale diminished and the price finally stabilizes. However, the third person perception 
may discourage the zeal of fundamentalists and yield different results. The analysis under third person 
perception is shown in the next case. 
  
Figure 4. examples of price fluctuation according to initial shock under case 1 
3.2.3 Case 2-1: Fixed third person perception, no IS available 
Third person perception is modeled as how a trader overestimates other traders’ trend following 
tendency, relative to oneself. The previous case is actually a special case of zero third person 
perception, because every trader thinks that other traders have same willpower as oneself. In other 
words, a trader estimates the average trend following tendency of fellow traders is exactly same as her 
tendency. Therefore, under zero third person perception as in the previous case, as long as the 
momentum is smaller than the trader’s willpower, the trader does not join the trend because the trader 
thinks that there are still more fundamentalists than trend followers in the market, since she represents 
the average trend following tendency and she still remains sane. 
In this experiment every trader has same amount of third person perception, as Jung (2012) suggested 
that people regardless of their expertise level think other people in general are more likely to believe 
messages like representative pattern, while themselves do not.  The news value is locked at -1000, 
which creates initial momentum of 0.5, to observe changes only from third person perception. Under 
zero third person perception unstable market state never happened, however as third person 
perception increases the instability of the market increases dramatically, because of the cascade, or 
positive feedback from third person perception. The following table shows the selected results 
according to third person perception. 
 
3rd person effect Instability ratio Avg(max_mom) Avg(std) 
0 0 0.533897 13.60225 
0.04 0.05 0.560312 80.37247 
0.08 0.15 0.617105 335.7444 
0.12 0.45 0.707996 964.9798 
0.16 0.7 0.875662 2312.106 
0.2 1 0.9999 4072.733 
Table 7. Instability under fixed third person perception 
It is clear that high third person perception triggers positive feedback to market crash, because it 
allows the market to overestimate the number of trend followers. The following figure graphically 
shows how third person perception changes market behavior. 
 Figure 5. Instability under fixed third person perception 
This suggests that small amount of third person perception may not affect the market behavior 
significantly. However, heavy third person perception can increases the market instability 
dramatically, because of the cascade of the overestimation. 
3.2.4 Case 2-2: Correlated third person perception, no IS available  
Jung(2012) and other scholars (Driscoll & Salwen, 1997; Peiser & Peter, 2000) also suggested that as 
higher the perceived their knowledge level, the stronger third person effect. This time the model 
correlates the amount of third person perception with each agent’s willpower. If an agent has strong 
willpower to resist accepting trends and charts, the agent has heavy third person perception. Since the 
market deterministically crashed once the third person perception reaches the value of 0.2, the 
maximum average third person perception is set to 0.2. The amount of third person perception is 
uniformly but not randomly distributed with different average value, correlated with each agent’s 
willpower. For clear comparison uncorrelated random assigned third person perception is also 
experimented and both results are shown in the following table. 
 
Avg. 3rd person 
effect 
Instability (corr) Instability (rand) Avg(max_mom) 
(corr) 
Avg(std) 
(corr) 
0 0 0 0.529222 9.844944 
0.04 0 0.03 0.565243 29.73764 
0.08 0.2 0.05 0.669794 564.759 
0.12 0.95 0.3 0.984007 3883.634 
0.16 1 0.85 0.9999 4396.074 
0.2 1 0.98 0.9999 4535.254 
Table 8. Instability under correlated third person perception  
The correlated case clearly shows faster approach to instability. Figure 6 graphically shows 
comparison. Even with the same average value, correlated case shows faster and steeper approach to 
market instability. Interpretation is that the more the gap a trained trader perceives between itself and 
the general public, the trader is likely to join the trend following sooner, triggering positive feedback 
to crash faster. In my model as long as only a few fundamentalists with strong beliefs can overturn the 
market crash by positive feedback to stability, however under correlated third person perception most 
of the fundamentalists join the trend following at the almost same time because the less they believe 
in the trend following, the sooner they give up hope and join the trend following. 
 Figure 6. Comparison between correlated and normal third person perception  
3.2.5 Case 3-1: IS skepticism is randomly distributed  
When external information system (IS) is available, a trader may not have to guess the average 
willpower of the traders anymore and may simply accept the report from the system. In this 
experiment, the IS is assumed to guessed the correct value, however, its technological quality is not 
perfect yet. These assumptions are needed because the simulation requires a certain guessed value 
from IS, and experiments when erroneous guess allowed did not yield much different results because 
the agents did not believe the problematic guess anyway. Also it is assumed that each agent has 
skepticism on IS, randomly distributed over [0,1].  
Suppose that the agents have a good IS. If initial momentum build up exceeds the real average 
willpower, which is set to 0.5, the market will crash because the trend followers “know” that the price 
will continue to drop. Therefore, the market behavior greatly changes at the initial momentum of 0.5. 
Two cases, a small news case which has initial momentum of 0.4 and a big news case which has 0.6 
are investigated under different level of IS quality and different amount of third person effect, are 
shown below: 
 
Figure 7. Small news case, 3 different level third person perception (low = 0.1, medium =0.2, 
heavy = 0.3)  
As investigated in case 2, even with small initial momentum, heavy third person perception can still 
create market instability. However, if information systems can provide reliable prediction of 
collective trader behavior, crash originated from third person perception can be prevented. 
Big news case in Figure 8 shows that the trustworthy IS can hasten market crash which was prevented 
by low level of third person perception. The zeal of fundamentalists was the key to initiate positive 
feedback to stability, even under dominance of trend following regime. However, a good IS simply 
removes the last barrier. Table 10 shows case descriptions and results. 
 
 Figure 8. Big news case, 3 different level third person perception (low = 0.0, medium =0.06, 
heavy = 0.12)  
 
Case(initial momentum) Small (0.4)  Big (0.6)  
Third person perception 
(Fixed value) 
Low 
(0.1) 
Medium 
(0.2) 
Heavy 
(0.3) 
Low 
(0.0) 
Medium 
(0.06) 
Heavy 
(0.12) 
IS quality which started stability 0.4 0.65 0.75    
IS quality which started instability    0.55 0.35 0.2 
Table 9. Effects of better IS quality on market instability, in conjunction with 3
rd
 person 
perception  
A good IS can work as a clairvoyant, actually determines the fate of the market. If the market was 
overly unstable due to third person perception, information system can stabilize it. However, if the 
market stability was barely sustained by low third person perception, information system can initiate 
instability. 
3.2.6 Case 3-2: IS skepticism is correlated with willpower  
In this experiment, skepticism on IS is correlated with the agent’s willpower. An agent who is more 
likely to accept representative patterns like trends or charts, is assumed to be more likely to accept 
guessed average willpower suggested by low quality IS. This assumption itself is following the 
reasoning behind third person perception: the less they know, the more they believe unreliable 
information. Both small news case and big news case are experimented under different correlation 
settings. 
 
Figure 9. Small news case under different IS skepticism correlation setting. Third person 
perception = 0.2  
Small news case shows that traders with correlated IS skepticism prevent the market behavior from 
going back to stability. As traders with high willpower values her own guess more than the external IS, 
her third person effect continue to prevail even with a good quality IS presents. 
 
Figure 10. Big news case under different IS skepticism correlation setting. Third person 
perception = 0.06  
For the similar reasons, in this case the traders with correlated IS skepticism prevent the market 
behavior from going unstable. Correlated skepticism, like the quality of IS, can be both good and bad 
to market stability, by preserving or removing errors from third person perception 
4 DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper added new considerations about effect of third person perception and its interaction with 
information systems, to the current understanding of battle between trend followers and 
fundamentalists, with agent based computational model. The results showed that third person 
perception can initiate positive feedback to market instability, and if a trader’s third person perception 
is correlated with the trader’s valuation of fundamentals, it can create steeper slope to market crash. 
Investors should be aware of that If a specific asset does not draws a lot of trend followers, it still can 
have significant instability, if the asset inspires heavy third person perception. For example, a high 
tech firm or a firm with a lot of complexity may increase third person perception of its analysts, who 
are naturally a fundamentalist. When the specific asset starts to draw trend followers, fundamentalists 
may quickly join the trend because of heavy third person perception. 
Good quality information systems can remove estimation error from third person perception. By 
doing so, it removes both good and bad errors. Good errors are that even the most extreme 
fundamentalist may still estimate other people’s behavior as similar as oneself. Such errors prevented 
market instability by initiating positive feedback to stability even under dominant trend following 
regimes. Bad errors are that even the most extreme trend follower may still estimate other people’s 
trend following tendency as more extreme than oneself. These errors may initiate market instability 
even with a very small shock in a stable market. Information systems may reduce both errors, making 
estimation of heterogeneous regime configurations more easier, however, it may either better or worse 
than without IS, according to the role of third person perception.  
My research has several limitations and possible future research directions. Third person perception 
theory mainly considers difference in criticizing external information (Paul et al., 2000; Perloff, 2009), 
and many studies suggested that trend followers are under effect of psychological bias, and such bias 
is usually from lack of knowledge (De Bondt, 1993). Also, the role of information system is simply 
modelled as a single parameter, which cannot fully reflect the characteristics of complex real world 
information systems such as Google and Facebook.  
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